Breaking Through the 'Silicon Shield':
Kolas Yotaka Talks with Chris Miller
By ｜ Kolas Yotaka
Taiwan's semiconductor industry has long been optimistically described as a "Silicon Shield." Proponents of this view believe that the presence of TSMC in Taiwan deters the Chinese Communist Party from launching an attack. However, after taking office, U.S. President Trump has repeatedly stated his intention to bring Taiwan's "Silicon Shield" to the United States. In February 2025, Trump announced that starting in April, the U.S. would impose a 25% tariff on imported chips. Companies wanting to avoid these tariffs were encouraged to quickly establish production facilities in the United States. In early March, Trump invited TSMC CEO Mark Liu to a press conference at the White House, where it was officially announced that TSMC would invest at least 3.3 trillion New Taiwan Dollars (100 billion USD) to produce in the U.S. its most advanced chips. Trump also remarked that "tariffs" are the most effective tool in the arsenal of economic measures, and that TSMC only agreed to invest in new facilities in the U.S. to avoid being subjected to tariffs of 25%, 50%, or even 100%. Trump proudly proclaimed that from now on, the U.S. would claim a significant share of TSMC's market share, potentially securing nearly 40% of global chip production capacity. Trump asserted that the chips the U.S. needs should be produced domestically.
For many years, the United States has imported a significant volume of chips, which are used not only in consumer products such as smartphones but also in military hardware equipped with AI capabilities, such as missiles. It is generally believed that President Trump's real objective goes further than simply imposing tariffs; the "tariffs" serve as a tool for negotiation. The ultimate goal is to disrupt the existing business model of the semiconductor supply chain, breaking the current concentration of advanced chip production in Taiwan. This is to prevent any potential crisis in Taiwan from jeopardizing U.S. chip supply. Hence, there is pressure on chip manufacturers from various countries to establish production facilities in the United States, bringing advanced manufacturing processes and packaging technologies with them. The aim is for the U.S. to reconfigure a semiconductor revenue distribution model prioritizing American interests, thereby advancing the goal of self-sufficiency.
While Trump's America First stance is to be expected from a U.S. president, the abrupt manner in which he is implementing his campaign promises has caused significant anxiety in Taiwan. For Taiwanese, TSMC is not just any company; it is a vital contributor to the nation’s GDP, a stabilizing pillar of the stock market, and is viewed as a "Silicon Shield" that safeguards national security. As anxiety builds, many start to rationalize the situation. For instance, some may reassure themselves with statements like, "The notion that 'TSMC will become AMSC' is merely Chinese propaganda!" or "We still don’t know if the tariff will be 25%, 50%, or 100%, so let's stop spreading negativity!" Others say, "The U.S. will ultimately harm itself!" or "Our chips are just components, not finished products, so we won't be impacted!" and "TSMC will simply pass the tariffs onto buyers, leaving Taiwan’s economy unharmed!" Furthermore, there are claims that imposing tariffs on TSMC will only lead to domestic inflation in the U.S., which will cause them to back off or face repercussions. Meanwhile, Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs has been working diligently to reassure the public, frequently stating that Taiwan's semiconductor industry will remain unaffected by shifts in U.S. policy. Nevertheless, some companies have already begun investigating the possibility of setting up production facilities in the United States. On the day Trump announced TSMC's investment in the U.S. alongside Chairman Mark Liu, TSMC's stock plummeted below 1,000 New Taiwan Dollars at open, contributing to a 400-point drop in the Taiwan stock market.
How can we manage this anxiety? Perhaps the question that we should be asking is this:
Is the “Silicon Shield” real?
I think our understanding of this question could benefit from the insights of Chris Miller, an expert in both military history and the history of semiconductors, and the author of 'Chip War’. He considers the notion of Taiwan's 'Silicon Shield’ to be unrealistic, and argues that the semiconductor supply chain should not be disproportionately concentrated in one country. These views differ significantly from the one-sided reports of much of the media here, and are not what most Taiwanese people want to hear.
Before starting to write this special report, I had briefly met Chris Miller, author of ‘Chip War,’ in work-related settings in Taiwan. Over the last year I had the opportunity to travel back and forth between Taiwan and the United States, and I was glad to be able reconnect with him for a more in-depth conversation.
My two most recent meetings with Chris took place once before the 2024 U.S. presidential election, when Chris was a guest lecturer in my class and I had a brief conversation with him after his talk; the other was after Trump had been elected. Since Chris happened to live in Boston, I used my free time to finally have an extended discussion with him outside of class. This allowed us to engage the topic without the pressure of needing to greet others or shake hands, making our conversation more relaxed and informal.
It turns out that Chris not only teaches "International History" at Tufts University's Fletcher School, specializing in technology, geopolitics, international economics, and Russian affairs, but he also serves as a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. He also holds a position as a visiting lecturer at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at his alma mater, Harvard University. In fact, Chris studied history at Harvard during his undergraduate years, so he is very familiar with the campus and can be considered a 'Harvard expert’. Actually, since he is still a visiting lecturer at the Harvard Davis Center, he has an office there. Boston and Cambridge are his home environment.
On the Sunday we met, although the temperature hovered near freezing, there was sunshine, which made it feel relatively warm. After spending the morning with his kids, he took an Uber from Boston in the afternoon for our appointment. I walked from my nearby residence in Boston along the Charles River to Harvard Square in Cambridge, where we arranged to meet at a café we often pass by. As soon as I saw him, I handed him a package of Taiwanese high-mountain green tea. He treated me to a cup of American Earl Grey tea, and we started chatting.
Now that the results of the U.S. election were known, and uncertainty he’d been removed, it seemed that we could finally move forward in our discussion without being distracted by the uncertainty or the overly dramatic political theatre that surrounds a presidential campaign. I was, of course, concerned about the shift in U.S. policy toward Taiwan following Trump's return to the White House, as well as the subsequent developments regarding TSMC's move to the U.S.; he, on the other hand, focused on the connections within the drone industry supply chain highlighted by several significant global conflicts. Naturally, it all comes back to chips.
Human technological progress is closely linked to war. One reason the U.S. invited TSMC to move to America was to prevent disruptions to the global chip supply in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Now, following "Chip War," Chris Miller is also conducting research on the drone industry. During our time after class, we discussed Trump's claims about "Taiwan stealing chips," whether the economies of scale enjoyed by TSMC could be replicated in the U.S., and touched on China's "Made in China 2025" initiative, along with the impact of DeepSeek on the chip and AI sectors. Chris also shared that he has already observed an impending new wave of geopolitical tensions driven by the drone industry supply chain.
Just as my class ended and I was waiting for the next session to begin, I was already eager to read his next book.
For many years, the United States has imported a significant volume of chips, which are used not only in consumer products such as smartphones but also in military hardware equipped with AI capabilities, such as missiles. It is generally believed that President Trump's real objective goes further than simply imposing tariffs; the "tariffs" serve as a tool for negotiation. The ultimate goal is to disrupt the existing business model of the semiconductor supply chain, breaking the current concentration of advanced chip production in Taiwan. This is to prevent any potential crisis in Taiwan from jeopardizing U.S. chip supply. Hence, there is pressure on chip manufacturers from various countries to establish production facilities in the United States, bringing advanced manufacturing processes and packaging technologies with them. The aim is for the U.S. to reconfigure a semiconductor revenue distribution model prioritizing American interests, thereby advancing the goal of self-sufficiency.
While Trump's America First stance is to be expected from a U.S. president, the abrupt manner in which he is implementing his campaign promises has caused significant anxiety in Taiwan. For Taiwanese, TSMC is not just any company; it is a vital contributor to the nation’s GDP, a stabilizing pillar of the stock market, and is viewed as a "Silicon Shield" that safeguards national security. As anxiety builds, many start to rationalize the situation. For instance, some may reassure themselves with statements like, "The notion that 'TSMC will become AMSC' is merely Chinese propaganda!" or "We still don’t know if the tariff will be 25%, 50%, or 100%, so let's stop spreading negativity!" Others say, "The U.S. will ultimately harm itself!" or "Our chips are just components, not finished products, so we won't be impacted!" and "TSMC will simply pass the tariffs onto buyers, leaving Taiwan’s economy unharmed!" Furthermore, there are claims that imposing tariffs on TSMC will only lead to domestic inflation in the U.S., which will cause them to back off or face repercussions. Meanwhile, Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs has been working diligently to reassure the public, frequently stating that Taiwan's semiconductor industry will remain unaffected by shifts in U.S. policy. Nevertheless, some companies have already begun investigating the possibility of setting up production facilities in the United States. On the day Trump announced TSMC's investment in the U.S. alongside Chairman Mark Liu, TSMC's stock plummeted below 1,000 New Taiwan Dollars at open, contributing to a 400-point drop in the Taiwan stock market.
How can we manage this anxiety? Perhaps the question that we should be asking is this:
Is the “Silicon Shield” real?
I think our understanding of this question could benefit from the insights of Chris Miller, an expert in both military history and the history of semiconductors, and the author of 'Chip War’. He considers the notion of Taiwan's 'Silicon Shield’ to be unrealistic, and argues that the semiconductor supply chain should not be disproportionately concentrated in one country. These views differ significantly from the one-sided reports of much of the media here, and are not what most Taiwanese people want to hear.
Before starting to write this special report, I had briefly met Chris Miller, author of ‘Chip War,’ in work-related settings in Taiwan. Over the last year I had the opportunity to travel back and forth between Taiwan and the United States, and I was glad to be able reconnect with him for a more in-depth conversation.
My two most recent meetings with Chris took place once before the 2024 U.S. presidential election, when Chris was a guest lecturer in my class and I had a brief conversation with him after his talk; the other was after Trump had been elected. Since Chris happened to live in Boston, I used my free time to finally have an extended discussion with him outside of class. This allowed us to engage the topic without the pressure of needing to greet others or shake hands, making our conversation more relaxed and informal.
It turns out that Chris not only teaches "International History" at Tufts University's Fletcher School, specializing in technology, geopolitics, international economics, and Russian affairs, but he also serves as a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. He also holds a position as a visiting lecturer at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at his alma mater, Harvard University. In fact, Chris studied history at Harvard during his undergraduate years, so he is very familiar with the campus and can be considered a 'Harvard expert’. Actually, since he is still a visiting lecturer at the Harvard Davis Center, he has an office there. Boston and Cambridge are his home environment.
On the Sunday we met, although the temperature hovered near freezing, there was sunshine, which made it feel relatively warm. After spending the morning with his kids, he took an Uber from Boston in the afternoon for our appointment. I walked from my nearby residence in Boston along the Charles River to Harvard Square in Cambridge, where we arranged to meet at a café we often pass by. As soon as I saw him, I handed him a package of Taiwanese high-mountain green tea. He treated me to a cup of American Earl Grey tea, and we started chatting.
Now that the results of the U.S. election were known, and uncertainty he’d been removed, it seemed that we could finally move forward in our discussion without being distracted by the uncertainty or the overly dramatic political theatre that surrounds a presidential campaign. I was, of course, concerned about the shift in U.S. policy toward Taiwan following Trump's return to the White House, as well as the subsequent developments regarding TSMC's move to the U.S.; he, on the other hand, focused on the connections within the drone industry supply chain highlighted by several significant global conflicts. Naturally, it all comes back to chips.
Human technological progress is closely linked to war. One reason the U.S. invited TSMC to move to America was to prevent disruptions to the global chip supply in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Now, following "Chip War," Chris Miller is also conducting research on the drone industry. During our time after class, we discussed Trump's claims about "Taiwan stealing chips," whether the economies of scale enjoyed by TSMC could be replicated in the U.S., and touched on China's "Made in China 2025" initiative, along with the impact of DeepSeek on the chip and AI sectors. Chris also shared that he has already observed an impending new wave of geopolitical tensions driven by the drone industry supply chain.
Just as my class ended and I was waiting for the next session to begin, I was already eager to read his next book.
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台灣人間魚詩社文創協會為依法設立、非以營利為目的之社會團體。以推廣現代詩、文學及其它藝術創作，推動社會創意產業文化為宗旨。
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2、人間魚詩生活誌及其它書籍出版
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台灣人間魚詩社文創協會為依法設立、非以營利為目的之社會團體。以推廣現代詩、文學及其它藝術創作，推動社會創意產業文化為宗旨。
贊助用途：
1、協會運作
2、人間魚詩生活誌及其它書籍出版
3、詩電影拍攝
贊助帳號：
第一銀行(007)松貿分行 168-10-002842 社團法人台灣人間魚詩社文創協會
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