Does Raising the Defense Budget Prevent Conflict or Provoke It?

Kolas Yotaka ╳ RADM. Mark Montgomery
By ｜ Kolas Yotaka

Kolas Yotaka is a Taiwanese author and politician. She previously served as spokesperson for both the Executive Yuan and the Office of the President. A former legislator with the Democratic Progressive Party, she now leads policy initiatives focused on supply chains, defense, and energy security.
After nearly four years of war in Ukraine, in late November 2025 a sudden ceasefire proposal shocked the world: a U.S.-drafted “peace agreement” listing 28 conditions for a Ukraine–Russia ceasefire, each of which appeared to reflect Russia’s point of view. In addition to requiring Ukraine to amend its constitution to pledge never to join NATO, it also demanded that Ukraine hold a presidential election within 100 days and replace President Zelensky. These were alarming enough, but what was truly shocking was that this U.S.-drafted peace agreement required Ukraine to cede the territories already occupied by Russia.

The United States had long been Ukraine’s strongest ally. Since Ukraine’s independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. had been a major force supporting its move toward Europe and its entry into the democratic camp, and it had long provided Ukraine with intelligence and military assistance to help withstand Russia’s aggression. No one expected that this time the U.S. version of a ceasefire agreement would align itself with Russia’s position, leaving Ukrainians—after four years of war—devastated, and prompting European leaders to voice their displeasure at Washington.

According to a Wall Street Journal report published on November 24, 2025, titled “How the U.S. Drafted a Russia-Friendly Peace Plan for Ukraine,” one reason the United States ultimately aligned itself with Russia was its assessment that after four years of war Ukraine “was in the weaker position militarily” and no longer had real negotiating leverage. Therefore, if Ukraine hoped to persuade Russia to halt its attacks, “it would need to concede more than Moscow in a peace deal to have any hope of getting the Kremlin to stop the war.”

On November 26, 2025, Taiwan’s Presidential Office held a press conference at which President Lai Ching-te personally announced an increase in the defense budget, pledging to raise defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2030. The 5 percent target is a public demand of the Trump administration, and represents Taiwan’s commitment to meet that expectation to the fullest extent possible. China’s Taiwan Affairs Office quickly issued a statement, warning that “the DPP authorities, for their own selfish interests, are yielding to every demand of external forces, and will only push Taiwan into disaster.” Meanwhile, the announcement did not gain broad support at home. Opposition parties sharply criticized the move, arguing that it would provoke even greater tensions and turn the Taiwan Strait into a “powder keg,” along with other predictable objections.

So, does increasing the defense budget to strengthen national security help prevent war, or does it invite it? I raised this question with Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, a retired U.S. officer who has visited Taiwan many times to participate in war-game exercises. He is now the Senior Director and a Senior Fellow at the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a Washington-based think tank. Mark previously served as Director of Operations at U.S. Pacific Command and has commanded destroyers and frigates in the U.S. Seventh Fleet, as well as Destroyer Squadron 15 and Task Group 75.4. He told me plainly, without hesitation, that he believes increasing the defense budget is necessary.

The war in Ukraine has been going on for nearly four years—what has Taiwan learned from it? In Ukraine, President Zelensky is exhausted and may well be forced into a ceasefire agreement that would be humiliating for both himself and his country. Yet even now, with what strength he has left, he continues to appeal to neighboring Europeans, and also to Americans:

“Russia kills our people on the front every day and strikes our cities and energy infrastructure daily. Therefore, while diplomatic efforts to end this war continue, it is important for our partners not to forget that Ukraine still needs sufficient defensive support, security assistance, and help to maintain resilience — every single day.”

In the face of pressure from Beijing, the space for rational dialogue in the Taiwanese political arena has disappeared. Even now, the question of whether to increase the defense budget continues to produce polarized confrontation in the legislature, online, on social media, in the press, and on political talk shows. In this policy debate over the defense budget, the parties involved are engaged in ideological battles, with virtually no discussion of a strategy that is genuinely grounded in Taiwan’s national interests. Before Beijing even takes action, we’ve already plunged into our own internal war, with political casualties everywhere. Against this backdrop, I wanted to invite a battle-tested military expert to look at Taiwan’s situation, and to urge that we first call a truce among ourselves and start looking for a way forward. If readers think of this installment as an emergency kit, then reading it is like putting on a life jacket for a moment—steadying ourselves as we wait for help and search for a way through.
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​The car drove out toward an industrial area on the outskirts of Frankfurt. Along the way, we passed a battery storage company before finally arriving at my destination. Nukem’s headquarters is located on the site of Germany’s first commercial nuclear power plant, which the company decommissioned 60 years ago.

“Now it’s a green field,”Thomas told me, smiling. “It’s a good reference. So when we had the chance two years ago, we moved back here — to the place where we gained our first experience in decommissioning. I considered it a good sign.”

Today, nearly a hundred engineers — nuclear, electrical, and industrial — work at the site. There’s even a cafeteria on the top floor. Thomas poured me a glass of water.

“It’s not dangerous, it’s clean. People would not accept anything else — and we wouldn’t either. For sure, we would never live next to a nuclear-spoiled, contaminated place,” he said.

As we sipped our hot water and looked out over the now-tranquil grounds of a once-active reactor, we spoke about the historic nuclear disasters — Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Fukushima — and how a single war has now forced the world to rethink the balance between energy and security.