​The Japan-China Conflict Is China's Doing, Not Takaichi's

By ｜ Kolas Yotaka

Kolas Yotaka is a Taiwanese author and politician. She previously served as spokesperson for both the Executive Yuan and the Office of the President. A former legislator with the Democratic Progressive Party, she now leads policy initiatives focused on supply chains, defense, and energy security.
In Huang Wei-hsiu's view, Takaichi Sanae is like a lone wolf. She operates independently, builds no factions, and relies on no political networks. Unlike most Japanese politicians, who come from political dynasties, Takaichi grew up in an ordinary, non-political family and learned to survive in adversity. Having come of age politically in the turbulent international environment that followed the year 2000, her defining characteristic, whether leading a party or leading a government, is policy clarity. She says what she means.
 
The LDP's message is very clear: China, North Korea, and Russia pose threats to us. If we do not strengthen our own defense capabilities to protect ourselves, we cannot survive. We cannot simply wait for others to come and help us.
 
Huang Wei-hsiu has lived in Tokyo for over twenty years. When we met, he was wearing a grey suit, a white shirt, and a blue-grey tie, with smiling eyes behind round, thin-framed glasses. If you didn't hear him speak, you might mistake him for a courteous Japanese gentleman. But he is a Taiwanese scholar, currently a specially appointed research fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia at the University of Tokyo, where he works alongside another prominent Japanese security scholar, Matsuda Yasuhiro. Huang has studied Japan's political parties in depth, with particular attention to Takaichi's policy positions. He noticed that her platform when she ran for LDP party leader in October 2025 was nearly identical to the one she ran on in the February 2026 general election. Security was the centerpiece, and she presented it plainly, without hedging, in a way that connected directly with Japanese voters.
 
The situation has developed to where it is now in a very clear way, and it is not Japan that has been provoking disputes. The threats in Japan's neighborhood are real. When people are confronted with threats like these, the question "what should we do?" naturally arises. Many Japanese people are thinking exactly that.
 
Huang observes that before the year 2000, Japanese scholars were reluctant to engage with national security topics. After 2010, as Japan's international environment grew increasingly difficult, many students began wanting to understand the security challenges Japan actually faced. That shift was a turning point. Whether it was North Korea's unannounced military exercises or the war in Ukraine, events that once seemed far away have begun affecting daily life in Japan directly, through disrupted air routes and rising energy prices. Most Japanese people have come to feel that Japan cannot afford to stay on the sidelines. Takaichi's personal appeal matters, but the larger reality is that Japan faces genuine international threats. That is the fundamental condition that allowed her clear, forceful security platform to land.
 
The instinct to protect yourself when faced with a threat is simply normal human nature.
 
Many pro-Beijing commentators have portrayed Takaichi as a symbol of revived militarism. Huang regards this as ideological posturing that ignores Japan's long-standing commitment to being a peaceful nation, and ignores the actual military threats Japan faces. Looking only at the fact that Takaichi has visited Yasukuni Shrine tells you nothing about why she swept through parliament.
 
Nobody wants to start a war. The LDP made the same argument in the election: strengthening defense is not about provoking conflict, it is about protecting ourselves. If you do not strengthen your own defense capabilities, you will end up as the side that is unilaterally invaded. I find that argument very persuasive, and it accurately reflects Japan's current situation.
 
Strengthening defense requires passing a defense budget. When Takaichi ran for LDP party leader in October 2025, she proposed raising Japan's defense budget to 2 percent of GDP by fiscal year 2027. The opposition in the Diet has been unable to mount a credible challenge.
 
The opposition, beyond criticizing, has not been able to explain how it would protect Japan. The Constitutional Democratic Party even abandoned its founding principle of questioning whether the security legislation Abe introduced was constitutional, and merged with another party. At that point you are just an electoral convenience, and of course you cannot earn the trust of the public.
 
Is it realistic that the defense budget could reach a historic 2 percent of GDP?
 
Given the current situation, the likelihood of raising the defense budget is very high. We don't even need to assume it will reach 2 percent. If the security environment in the region continues to deteriorate, there will simply be no choice but to raise it.
 
Huang is careful to note that Japan's security policy has been evolving incrementally since 2000, and is not the achievement of any single person. As for Takaichi's statement in the Diet about a Taiwan contingency, he cautions against reading it simply as a pro-Taiwan gesture.
 
Prime Minister Takaichi made that specific statement under persistent pressure from Representative Okada, and she later indicated she would avoid giving such specific examples in the future. Some scholars have also argued that being too explicit about specific scenarios actually reduces Japan's flexibility. But the fact that she said it signals that Japan has been thinking through what it would do if a Taiwan contingency occurred. Japan has always been doing this. There are many things you can do but cannot say out loud. The planning and preparation have been ongoing, which is precisely why there is no need to retract it. She didn't say anything wrong. Does that make her deliberately "pro-Taiwan"? No. It is simply that stability in the Taiwan Strait has always been inseparable from Japan's own security.
 
Some have blamed Takaichi's Taiwan contingency statement for provoking Beijing's anger and bringing pressure down on Japan. Huang finds this framing unfair. The CCP has long been wary of Takaichi precisely because she is right-leaning and anti-communist. Even if she had never mentioned Taiwan in the Diet, tensions between Japan and China would have found another flashpoint sooner or later.
 
My personal view is that Japan's long-term national interest has always been stability and peace in the Asia-Pacific, and developing its domestic economy within that stable and peaceful environment.
 
In Huang's reading, Japan's national interest has always pointed toward cross-strait peace and toward drawing China into a democratic framework, even if that goal has never been achieved. The Taiwan contingency remark in the Diet was an unfortunate coincidence that accelerated a conflict already waiting to surface. But the root of the problem lies with China, in his view, not with Japan.
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