“America’s Ability to Defeat a Chinese Attack on Taiwan Is Eroding”

By ｜ Kolas Yotaka

Kolas Yotaka is a Taiwanese author and politician. She previously served as spokesperson for both the Executive Yuan and the Office of the President. A former legislator with the Democratic Progressive Party, she now leads policy initiatives focused on supply chains, defense, and energy security.
China has continued to aid Russia’s war in Ukraine through oil purchases, ammunition production, and other forms of support. After nearly four years of brutal fighting, many in Taiwan have projected their own hopes and fears onto Ukraine—casting Russia as China, and Ukraine as Taiwan.

Over these four years, Taiwanese people have found countless ways to show solidarity. Some traveled to Ukraine to join the fight. Others updated their social-media profiles with symbols of solidarity. Taiwanese doctors volunteered in Ukrainian hospitals. One orchid grower, moved by Ukraine’s resistance, used a nano-spray technique to dye orchids in the colors of Ukraine’s flag. For a time, these yellow-and-blue “Ukraine orchids” seemed to be everywhere.

But according to media reports, a ceasefire “peace plan” drafted by the United States—leaked in late November—suggested that Ukraine no longer had the strength to resist Russia and therefore lacked bargaining power. The proposal called on Ukraine to make concessions, even to give up territory, and stated that Washington would not discuss security guarantees before an agreement was reached.

For Taiwan, watching this unfold has been deeply unsettling.


Taiwan Is Ukraine. 
And Taiwan Is Not Ukraine.

Taiwan is Ukraine. Like Ukraine, Taiwan’s defense relies disproportionately on American support. Ukraine depends on the United States for satellite intelligence and Patriot air-defense systems. It relies on U.S. protection of its energy infrastructure through the winter. Washington also provides major financial and humanitarian assistance that keeps Ukraine’s government functioning and its economy stable. Taiwan, similarly, relies on the United States for training, joint defense support, weapons procurement, and intelligence sharing.

At the same time, Taiwan is not Ukraine. Ukraine is a land power with neighbors in Europe that can support it. Even if American resolve wavers, Europe has begun increasing its weapons-production capacity. When President Volodymyr Zelensky visited the White House in late August 2025, seven European leaders accompanied him in a show of solidarity. And when the 28-point U.S. peace plan became public, European leaders called Washington to voice their strong objections. Europe has been slow, hesitant, and at times insufficient in supplying weapons, but at least its governments openly oppose Russia’s invasion and have maintained a consistent position.

Taiwan, by contrast, is an island. Most countries in the world will not even call it a “country,” fearing the consequences for their economic and diplomatic ties with Beijing. Few are willing to risk military cooperation with Taiwan. If Beijing declares the Taiwan Strait to be its internal waters and asserts that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China,” and if the United States were to side with China and sacrifice Taiwan, Taiwan would be left even more isolated—pushed into a dead-end.

No nation will readily send troops to fight for another. Increasingly, intelligence and reporting suggest that China’s military may soon surpass America’s not only in ground and air capabilities but also in cyber warfare. As the war has dragged on, Ukraine has grown increasingly strained and isolated, and has gradually been forced to accept that, in the end, it can rely only on itself. Taiwan must come to the same realization and strengthen its own defenses.

On November 26, Taiwan’s president Lai Ching-te announced that Taiwan would raise defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2030, signaling Taiwan’s willingness to share risks and shoulder part of America’s defense burden in the Trump administration’s new environment. But Beijing quickly escalated its pressure campaign, launching cognitive-warfare attacks within Taiwan. Pro-China parties and media fiercely opposed the defense-budget increase, arguing that it would turn the Taiwan Strait into a powder keg. Claiming to speak for “the interests of the people,” pro-China groups argue that to avoid war, Taiwan must face reality and compromise with Beijing.

This well-worn playbook leans on public fears of war, invoking ‘the people’ to pressure the ruling party into choosing between‘winning the 2026 and 2028 elections’ and ‘trusting the United States,’ all with the aim of pushing Taiwanese citizens away from the idea of a well-armed Taiwan.


So what should Taiwan fear more―China’s threats, or America’s betrayal?

Taiwan is willing to give everything in exchange for peace. It should not be forced to choose between fear and disappointment.

​